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THE CHURCH AND SECOND MARRIAGE

John T. Catoir

DIVORCE: NO LONGER UNTHINKABLE

Rosemary Ruether

RATIONAL ETHICS SAYS 'NO'

Germain G. Grisez

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"Another FAC who had just flown

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JOHN LEO

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Anent Vietnam

Pittsville, Wisc.

To the Editor: Anent your recent editorial on Vietnam—a couple of weeks ago! Whoever it was who wrote the editorial certainly seemed to have a Communist brainwashing. I'm convinced of that now. *Peace at any cost seemed to be his cry.* Phooey on him! . . .

Anent the pictures by Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times. If my memory serves me right he got clobbered on CBS but good. Again I think the pictures were labeled as they should have been as FRAUDS. As I have always felt the New York Times does not tell the truth and I would question a lot of the "stuff" it publishes.

Anent the Pope. I think he has been misinformed about the United States and its policy. I certainly could think of a better man than Robert Kennedy to make an approach to the Pope. In fact, when the Pope was critical of the United States—I felt he deserved a good belt in the nose. He sure was not infallible at that point. . . . (REV.) PETER A. EIDEN

The Renewal Mess

Baltimore, Md.

To the Editors: Let me assure Daniel Callahan that he is not a lone Joseph Alsop ("The Renewal Mess," March 3). But is it possible that Mr. Callahan's politely intellectual analysis is itself an ingredient—not a symptom—of the mess? My plea is for plainer talk and lots of it. Aren't messes the results of procrastination; of lack of simplicity, directness and honesty; of organizational bungling; of childish fantasy in a grown-up world?

Or shallow stupidity, however human a concern that may be in a divine institution?

Is the Colombian hierarchy's—and Rome's—treatment of Father Arias a scandal, or isn't it? Is the profusion of such scandals really obscured by all those grays, or are they not glaringly,

(Continued on page 133)

'THE WORLD IS SICK'

Times change, but perhaps not as much as we sometimes imagine. When *Rerum Novarum* was issued in 1891, it is said that rich men stalked indignantly out of churches at the very mention of Leo XIII's insidious document. Accurate or not, the story is sure to make lecture audiences or classroom hearers shake their heads in amused disbelief. How, they wonder, could anyone react in such a fashion to what now seems a rather mild analysis of the social question? But was the reaction of the *Wall Street Journal* in describing Pope Paul's new encyclical as "warmed-over Marxism" really very different?

The encyclical, "On the Development of Peoples," is a 20,000-word document primarily concerned with the problems of developing nations. Begun almost as soon as Paul became Pope, it urges rich nations to help those who are "struggling to free themselves from the yoke of hunger, misery, disease and ignorance, who seek a larger share in the fruits of civilization and a more active realization of their human personality." Seeking "authentic development . . . the transition from less human conditions to those which are more human," the encyclical calls for "a new humanism which will enable modern man to find himself anew by embracing the higher values of love and friendship, of prayer and contemplation."

To the *Wall Street Journal*, Pope Paul's encyclical "lends the mantle of religion to certain ideas which are profoundly secular in origin." Almost simultaneously, Father John Courtney Murray described the encyclical for the N.Y. Times as "the Church's definitive answer to Marxism." What is one to make of the flatly contradictory views of the American business community's leading journal and the man who is probably America's best-known Catholic theologian?

The quotation from Father Murray may unintentionally mislead hasty Times readers who fail to dip into the encyclical. *Populorum Progressio* is by no means an anti-Communist tract in the style of the thirties, or even of the fifties. This is not what Father Murray was suggesting. The major question of the day, as he sees it, is what sort of humanism will be called upon to organize the world. The Marxists have proposed their way. "Now Pope Paul

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VI has issued a detailed plan to accomplish the same goal on the basis of true humanism—humanism that recognizes man's religious nature."

How can men read one document so differently? The difference, of course, is in their views of the whole economic and productive machinery. Like its predecessors from *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno* to *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris*, Pope Paul's "On the Development of Peoples" takes an essentially sacramental view of the universe, seeing economic activity not as an end in itself but as a means to a better human life. In this sense the new encyclical is anti-Marxist, but it is also anti-capitalist, at least insofar as capitalist theorists would consider the profit motive and the free play of the market as the primary criteria in achieving the good society. The Popes do not flatly condemn competition; they simply say that competition alone cannot rule society, that in given situations other factors may have to take precedence. Private property is not condemned, indeed it is defended; but its social nature and the responsibilities that go with it are also stressed, as well as the right of the state to restrict, regulate or even expropriate if necessary. Perhaps it would be accurate to say that the Pope's new humanism is not so much anti-Marxist or anti-capitalist as it is super-Marxist and super-capitalist; it goes beyond both by refusing to turn impersonal economic processes into graven images.

"On the Development of Peoples" amplifies ideas to be found in the Vatican Council's "Church in the Modern World." Called the charter for the new papal Commission on Peace and Justice, the new encyclical emphasizes that the social question, the division of society into the haves and the have-nots, has become worldwide in character. In contrast to earlier social encyclicals, the problem it stresses is not so much that of the propertyless class as of the propertyless nation. There are wealthy countries and there are poor; in today's world society, the underdeveloped countries are the proletariat. The effects of colonialism linger, and left to itself the situation gets worse instead of better: "Rich peoples enjoy rapid growth, whereas the poor develop slowly."

Wealthy countries may feel called on to give alms, but do they have a positive obligation toward poor countries that goes far beyond this? Does the parable of the Good Samaritan have an inescapable message for nations as well as for individuals? Paul clearly says 'yes.' We should help in emergencies, we should give food to the hungry, but this is not enough: "It is a question, rather, of building a world where every man, no matter what his race, religion or nationality, can live a fully human life, freed from servitude imposed on him by other men or by natural forces over which he has not sufficient control; a world where freedom is not an empty word and where the poor man Lazarus can sit down at the same table with the rich man."

The goal, in short, is recognition of human solidarity

and implementation of this vision in deeds. As the Pope pointed out, each man will in the light of the rapidly changing world situation have to search his conscience, "a conscience that conveys a new message for our times."

"If someone who has the riches of this world sees his brother in need and closes his heart to him," quotes the Pope, "how does the love of God abide in him?"

Are we prepared to pay what international social justice calls for? Will we accept higher taxes to help the developing nations? Are we ready to pay higher prices for imported goods so that nations producing them may be more equitably treated? It is specific and practical questions like these that are posed for the individual by the new encyclical, and surely the Pope is right in raising them and right in stressing their connection with peace in the world.

It is all very well—indeed, imperative—that we ship food to the starving in India and elsewhere, but it is time to examine U.S. trade policies that may in fact promote starvation elsewhere. Millions in the underdeveloped countries would give up all claim to our alms if only we would pay a fair price for the agricultural products and raw materials that represent their major resources. Even at that, though, it is possible to exaggerate what it would take to really help the underdeveloped countries. All the years and effort of the massive and highly successful Marshall Plan cost roughly what the Vietnamese war takes for seven months. We may need to sacrifice a little, but it would be comparatively easy to multiply our efforts many times over, especially if peace can be achieved in Vietnam.

Aside from the *Wall Street Journal* and a few expected conservative sources, reaction to the new encyclical has been uniformly favorable. The President of the Central Conference of American Rabbis praised it as being "in the highest tradition of ecclesiastical statesmanship." Population experts and Planned Parenthood leaders hailed Pope Paul's remarks on demography (a point on which he seemed to us to close no doors and indeed, by welcoming government programs, to advance). The National Council of Churches hailed the encyclical and urged its members to give it immediate and careful study. But what will it all add up to? At this point, no one can say with any certainty. What is desperately needed is something that will touch the consciences of people and their leaders, something to awaken them to the dimensions of the problem we face. Unfortunately, although this is better than most, the formal language of encyclicals is not well calculated for that purpose, and *Populorum Progressio* will fail unless it is, so to speak, translated into the vernacular of everyday national and international policy. Such translation is clearly crucial, for as the Pope said: "The world is sick. Its illness consists less in the unproductive monopolization of resources by a small number of men than in the lack of brotherhood among individuals and peoples."

CHICAGO CONFERENCE

The meeting of the "Chicago Conference of Laymen" on April 2 was remarkable in a number of respects. It marked, for one thing, the first time since the Council that a large and important group of laymen have attempted to establish an independent lay organization in a diocese. For another, the turnout at the meeting far exceeded the expectations of the organizers. Originally, it was hoped that 200-400 people might attend; instead nearly 1500 showed up.

Actually, the success of the first public meeting of the Chicago Conference is probably not so surprising after all. Chicago has for years been the heartland of many important lay apostolic organizations. There was, then, a firm base on which to erect the Conference, a base which only a handful of other American cities could pretend to claim. There was also the helpful precedent of the Chicago Priests' Association which was formed not long ago, and formed also as an unsanctioned body. In a word, the Chicago Conference of Laymen did not spring out of a total vacuum: the city was ripe and the time was ripe. That is crucial, for a major and persistent difficulty in most cities is that the laity have had practically no experience in organizing themselves to do and say what they think needs doing and saying. By and large, they have waited for a move from on high—a move which in most places has not and may not be made.

It is of course much too early to judge the success of the Chicago Conference. The test of the Conference will lie in its ability to gain even greater lay support, in its capacity to effect significant pressure, in the power of its goals and programs to engender enthusiasm and change, and in its capacity to resist any attempts at suppression, on the one hand, or domestication, on the other. There is probably little danger of suppression, but there is always the danger of a loss of impetus or a diffusion of direction. It is on such crucial points that the quality of the leadership is vital, and in that respect Chicago is unusually blessed with experienced, indeed battle-tested, veterans.

The tone of the April 2 meeting made this last point clear. There was no fawning for the approval of authority, but neither was there any suggestion of a rebellion against authority. Instead, what came through was a clear sense among the assembled lay people of their rights in relationship to authority and of the importance of independent action on their part. In the words of Professor John Bannan of Loyola University, ". . . Our legitimacy does not rest upon the approbation, formal or otherwise, of our bishop. We have not sought this and, I suspect, are unlikely to do so. Our legitimacy lies in the right of a group of members of the Church to organize freely in order to act in the interest of the Church as they see this interest."

What the Chicago Conference sees with great clarity is that the laity must have the self-confidence and the nerve to cease depending upon authority for all initiatives. Naturally, this is a theme which has been echoed time and again in the past few years. But with the exception of Chicago and some more limited ventures in other cities, there has been little evidence that the laity have in fact been willing to display the initiative they affirm in theory. Too many laymen continue to want approval and sanction before they act. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First of all, they may not get approval and sanction. But, secondly, and more importantly, the desire for approval may well lead them to state their case and organize their actions in a way which immediately compromises their independence and their goals.

The whole point of the present demand to achieve some degree of parity among bishops, priests and laity requires that the laity press their desires and their goals by their methods and in their language. If the laity try to conform their hopes and plans wholly to the requirements and expectations of priests and bishops, they compromise at the very outset the potentialities of their position. This is not to say that the laity should be unwilling to work with priests and bishops; obviously they should. It is only to say that they must have the solid conviction that they perform this work as true equals and not as inferiors.



INDIA GOES TO THE POLLS

BEFORE CHAOS, ONE LAST CHANCE

When Atulya Ghosh, the Congress Party boss of Bengal, was beaten in the recent Indian elections, there were demonstrations of joy in the streets of Calcutta such as had not been seen since the day twenty years ago when India became independent. All over the country, as the defeats of famous Congress leaders were recorded, similar rejoicing broke out. The joy which the people expressed was the other face of the bitter discontent with the ruling party

which has been building up since the last days of Nehru's reign.

Congress, it is true, will continue to hold power in India. Its majority of just over 40 seats will shelter the new government from defeat over the next five years, provided there are no further breakaways from Congress ranks like those which have already weakened it in Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala and other regions.

Yet no one in India, even among the Congress hierarchy, sees the election as anything other than a defeat from whose consequences the ruling party escaped only because of the disunity of its opponents. Congress has never enjoyed a popular majority in India, and since 1957, when under Nehru it reached its peak of influence with 48% of the popular vote, it has slipped steadily, through 45% in 1962, to this year's dangerous low point of 39.6%.

It is in studying the results in detail that the extent of the Indian people's rejection of Congress becomes evident. Five Cabinet ministers, including the once popular Food Minister Subramaniam, and three ministers of lesser rank in the Central Government, have been defeated. All the leading Party officials, including the President, Kamaraj, and the Treasurer, Atulya Ghosh, have been rejected by the electorate, together with four Congress Chief Ministers of states. In eight of the states—more than half of them—Congress has failed to gain an absolute majority, and in at least seven it will certainly have no part in forming new governments. In the State Assemblies, where there have in many cases been electoral alliances among opposition parties, Congress had gained only about 45% of the seats.

Even more striking than the extent of the opposition to Congress has been its variety. It includes the urban populations. In Bombay, S. K. Patil, the long-standing Congress boss, was defeated; in Delhi the Jan Sangh, a right-wing Hindu party, won 6 out of 7 parliamentary seats and control of the municipal council; in Calcutta the left-wing parties gained heavily, and in Madras City, as well as Madras State, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a Tamil regionalist party, has won control. Even outside the cities, the growing middle class, frustrated by controls, has turned away from Congress all over India to support right-wing parties of various types, from the DMK in Madras to Swatantra in Orissa and Rajasthan and Jan Sangh in Uttar Pradesh.

The elections also eloquently reveal a conflict of generations. The glamor that attached to the men who fought for freedom has at last disappeared. The celebrated old fighters have been beaten, and beaten usually by much younger men; the hostility to the passing generations has pursued even those of its members who fought outside Congress ranks, and the rebels Krishna Menon and Acharya Kripalani have joined their former associates in defeat. Alone among the Congress Old Guard, Morarji Desai won a resounding victory, but his triumph was really a popular protest against the defeated leaders of the inner "Syndicate" of the Party, Patel and Ghosh, who had prevented him from becoming Prime Minister on the death of Shastri.

The complexity of the situation is increased by the fact that the swing against Congress has not been in one political direction alone. The extremes of the spectrum have both gained ground, and, with the diminishing strength of Congress, a right-left polarization of Indian politics

at last seems a possibility for the future. The gains of the left are local, mainly in Kerala and Bengal. The gains of the right are widely spread, in Madras, in hungry Orissa and Bihar, in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan.

But even the resurgent right does not speak with a single voice; it mirrors the complexity of regional and communal divisions. The DMK is largely a party of highly literate Madrasis, with great student as well as peasant support, and dedicated to defending the linguistic integrity of the Dravidian south. Swatantra is a pro-western, free-enterprise party, again with a considerable educated following, and much support among the capitalists; R. K. Birla, one of India's greatest industrialists, will take his seat in the Lok Sabha as a Swatantra member. The Jan Sangh is an avowedly Hindu communalist party, which has made great capital out of the agitation to ban the slaughter of cows; its successes represent a massive return, in the Hindi-speaking north, to the politics of caste and religion. Another aspect of the resurgence of traditionalism has been the dramatic comeback of the rajas. In Madhya Pradesh alone, 40 princes contested for seats, and among the heads of famous warrior houses who will once again have their share in governing India are the Maharajas of Bharatpur and Patiala, the Maharani of Jaipur, and the Rajmata of Gwalior. Their success is bound up with the nostalgia for the "good old times" which is beginning to sweep India; the British Raj has not yet been historically rehabilitated, but that may well come after another Congress term in office.

The cities, the young, the past, the future, have all risen against Congress. So have the regions; the deep Dravidian south of Kerala (resentful at economic neglect) and Madras (resentful at Hindi linguistic centralism); the poor eastern rimlands of Bengal, Orissa and Bihar, and the western frontier states of Punjab and Rajasthan, with their martial and independent traditions. The one state where Congress gained a really spectacular victory was backward Madhya Pradesh, the central massif of India, where communications are difficult and the peasants still retain the loyalties of twenty years ago. Balancing that gain have been spectacular losses in the key northern state of Uttar Pradesh, the former Congress heartland from which have come all three of the Prime Ministers who have ruled India since independence.

The Reasons Why

Some of the reasons for the rejection of Congress are obvious. Among them are the problems imposed by nature—drought, food shortages, rising population—which any government would have had to face and which no administration could solve without the massive foreign aid that hurts Indian pride and wins support for opposition parties who can glibly theorize about self-sufficiency. Few intelligent Indians in fact blame Congress for the existence of such troubles, but much resentment has been

caused by inefficient distribution of food and by the elevation of political over economic considerations even in this vital matter; real and apparent Congress strongholds like Andhra and Madras have been allowed to hold grain supplies away from less fortunate regions to suit the maneuvering of powerful local Party bosses.

Congress has also lost prestige over matters much more trivial than the food situation. One would be happy, for instance, to say that the cow slaughter controversy had been exaggerated by the foreign press; unfortunately this is not the case, and the government's failure to take any really definite stand has angered conservative Hindus on the one side and disturbed westernized secularist Indians on the other.

But cow slaughter is mainly a northern issue. The problem that has loomed as large in the eyes of voters as the food question and the related inflation of recent months, is that of centralism: centralism through the attempt to impose Hindi as the sole national language; administrative centralism through the proliferation of regulations emanating from Delhi; economic centralism through the stranglehold on industrial enterprise created by the power of the Planning Commission and the arid London-School-of-Economics socialism which for years has dominated Indian policies (the real dead hand of the British past). The administrative and economic autonomy of the states was a burning issue in the election.

These are all current issues which vitally concern people in a country undergoing great transitions. The issues of the early days of nationhood have vanished. Independence is won and taken for granted; no politician any longer gains votes by recalling his sufferings in that distant cause. And the whole mystique of pacifism and simple life associated with Gandhi has also dwindled away. It died, in fact, in the wars with China and Pakistan. Even Hindu traditionalists like the Jan Sangh are reconciled to an industrial future in which India will further its nationalistic purposes by becoming an atomic power.

The election has been fought, however, not only on the record of the Congress government, but also on that of the Congress Party as an organization. The rejection of those who for years have molded and controlled it, both national leaders like Kamaraj and regional bosses like Ghosh and Patil, demonstrates the deep resentment which the young, the educated, and the urban workers feel towards the Party machine as such. Significantly, Kamaraj was defeated by a young student leader and both Ghosh and Patil by trade union leaders. The Party is ridden by corruption—even now charges of misappropriation of election funds by local bosses are being raised—and the new classes and generations want honesty and integrity in government. The Party has become arrogant and indifferent, and the new classes and generations want responsiveness in government and liberation from paternalistic orthodoxies. Trying to preserve a consensus of

many conflicting vested interests, the Party has become vacillating in its policies and weakened by internal feuds, and the new classes and generations want dynamic leaders and definite directions. The Congress leaders have in fact failed to recognize the growing sense of political involvement among the people which is a result of their own past struggles.

All this does not mean necessarily that Congress is finished or even on the way out. Much depends on its ability to reorganize, and on the use which its opponents will make of their chances in the states. The appointment of Morarji Desai as Deputy Prime Minister (the position Shastri held) and Minister of Finance will reassure the business community and may mean a relaxation of doctrinaire socialist policies.

In the states where Congress failed to gain a majority, hundreds of ministers (many of them new to politics) will be gaining their first experience of office. Only in Madras is a single non-Congress party strong enough to hold office on its own. However, the feeling among all parties towards Congress is so bitter that, rather than accept any form of alliance with it, they have formed coalitions covering the whole political spectrum. In West Bengal, for example, the new government will rest on a coalition of ten different parties ranging from Left Communists to Jan Sangh. How such broad coalitions will actually work remains to be tested. If past Indian experience gives us any guide, they will not last long; already Dr. Lohia, leader of the Samyutka Socialists, has announced his party's intention to "pull down" any government formed with its support that does not bring "some big and revolutionary change" within six months. Real stability of government among the opposition states seems likely only in Kerala, Madras and Orissa, and then only if Delhi refrains from applying economic and political pressures.

In the final analysis, India is left with a chastened and reduced Congress Party which has been given a last chance within the democratic framework to prove its ability to handle the problems of India; if it fails within the next five years, it will lose the narrow margin of support that has now kept it in power. No single opposition movement of sufficient size or standing to take its place has yet emerged; up to now all the existing parties are too narrow in terms either of region, class or community to create the possibility of a two-party system in the foreseeable future. The chaos of a system of many minority parties which will encourage the country's naturally fissiparous tendencies is thus a real threat in India by the early 1970's. The receiver of that chaos, more and more observers believe, could be, as in Pakistan, the army—united, moderately efficient, relatively uncorrupt. As an alternative to the triumph of Communism by default, many Indians in this unGandhian period would prefer it.

GEORGE WOODCOCK

(Mr. Woodcock is the author of several books on Asia, most recently, Asia, Gods and Cities).



ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

INSTANT RENEWAL?

It is hard to believe that the Council is only a little over a year behind us. In its March 20 issue *Newsweek* said that Catholicism had changed more as a result of the Council than at any other period in its 2000-year history, and the survey of American Catholics carried out by its imaginative Religion Dept. certainly indicates "a climate favorable to change" among Catholics.

Take the changes in the liturgy, especially the Englishing of most of the Mass. Some object to the changes, but an overwhelming majority in the survey "vehemently favor the Mass's new flavor," and, most importantly, 72% of those under 35 are in this category. Interestingly enough, the change on Friday abstinence seemed to have caused more trauma; only four out of ten embraced the change without anguish.

As he wrestles with the birth control issue, the Pope might find the *Newsweek* findings on the subject instructive. Of those interviewed, 73% want a change. Among college students the results are more striking, 84% for change. Many Catholics not only want change; they are practicing birth control without waiting for a decision by Rome. *Newsweek* found that 38% of Catholics surveyed already used an artificial device or birth control pills.

The divorce figures provided some surprises. According to *Newsweek*, two out of three would approve, not divorce, but easier annulment in cases where one partner is clearly innocent. Only 7% would be "upset a great deal" about easing the rules. On divorce, although 50% are opposed, 39% are in favor of accepting it in special circumstances—where one partner is incurably mentally ill, is a chronic alcoholic, etc. On a related point, 48% would like to see priests be permitted to marry.

On the Pope, American Catholics seem confused. Theologians restrict the scope of papal infallibility, hedging it about with limitations and conditions, but in *Newsweek's* sample four out of ten "believe that everything the Pope says is law. The remainder seems to hold the convenient belief that his absolute authority extends only to those changes with which they agree."

What has all of this to do with renewal? These findings accurately reflect, I think, the mood of change that characterizes the post-Council Church, for both good and bad. Two apparently contradictory statements are true. *Newsweek* is correct in saying that Catholicism has changed more as a result of the Council than at any other period in its history. At the same time I am convinced that one is equally correct to say that we have hardly begun; we have not really applied the wisdom of a Rahner yet, let alone a Bonhoeffer.

Look at the facts. The Council was only a beginning,

but very few dioceses seem to be making a real effort to apply even the Council, not next year but now. Most are trying a few cautious moves, being careful not to rock the boat in the process. A few have resolutely turned their backs on change and oppose everything. For example, relatively few dioceses ever held Little Councils of their own. But if these are not held, what effective means exist for the bishop to know what the problems are or at least what the clergy and laity of his diocese think they are? The same thing goes for the parish, only perhaps more so. The Vatican Council urged the layman to make his views known through institutions created for that purpose. But where are those institutions in most dioceses and parishes? They simply do not exist.


A sizable number of priests are leaving their ministry and nuns their convents these days. However, any bishop who wants to blame this state of affairs on the spirit of the age in general and the excesses of the Vatican Council in particular would be better advised to look closer to home for the explanation. I have met all too many excellent priests and dedicated Sisters who were at their wits' ends because their bishop or pastor behaved as if the Council had never happened.

As far as collegiality is concerned, we are just beginning to take a few faltering steps toward it. The new synod of bishops will meet for the first time in Rome next fall. A few religious communities are working to make collegiality a reality, and a few bishops are really trying to consult and share their authority. (How refreshing to read, by the way, that Bishop Clarence G. Issenmann of Cleveland had asked people, priests and religious of his diocese to help in selecting a new auxiliary bishop!)

The same thing—that we are just beginning—could be said about most other crucial issues. The spirit of ecumenism is just starting to be felt in most parishes, where priests, ministers and rabbis hardly know each other; the Mass is in English and the priest in most places faces the people, but surely this is only the barest beginning of liturgical creativity; by and large the secular city is successfully and completely ignored by the average parish; in most places the layman's participation in decision-making and policy-formation is in the talking stage, at best; throughout America the tone of the Church is still heavily clerical.

In short, reform has hardly begun, and what I am arguing is that no one can claim that he has seen the renewed Church and that it is not good enough. The Church *will* be reformed, of that I am quite confident, but so far at least we can not even see the bare outlines of the final structure.

JAMES O'GARA



"Why raise the issue of Pharisaism in connection with our fidelity to the law on marriage? Perhaps because very often we do not respect the real mystery of the Sacrament of Matrimony as much as we respect the laws of the Church."

THE CHURCH AND SECOND MARRIAGE

JOHN T. CATOIR

There are many good people in their second marriage, unable to go to the sacraments because they have been judged to be living a life of sin. But as a matter of fact, some persons in this predicament may not actually be in a state of sin. They pray deeply, they show reverence and respect for others, they demonstrate genuine responsibility toward the well-being of their children and they love God.

Marriage is indissoluble. We can never dispute this basic teaching. Nevertheless there must be a marriage first in order to be indissoluble. In many cases a marriage fails because it never was a true marriage to begin with. If an ecclesiastical annulment could be obtained more reasonably than the present law permits, the problem would be less critical. The following explanation of the Church's law applied to a concrete case will serve as an illustration of the conflict which can arise between a just law and the private good of an individual conscience.

According to the Catholic Church, marriage is a public act. It is not a private affair. Marriage enjoys the favor of law, which is to say that a marriage, by legal presumption, is always considered valid unless someone can prove it to be invalid.

Let us suppose that a girl was abandoned by her husband within a year or so of their marriage. He left telling her that he only married her to give the baby a name, and that he never intended to stay with her permanently. She would have solid grounds for an ecclesiastical annulment case. It would then be her burden to prove these facts in an ecclesiastical court. She would have to present two or more witnesses to establish conclusively that her husband lied to the priest before the marriage when he was asked: "Do you intend a permanent union?" It must

be remembered that if it was a Catholic marriage, the parish church most probably has his signature on a sworn document stating, among other things, that he did intend a permanent union. The difficult burden of proving that he lied at the time of the marriage falls on her.

Because this is so difficult, only a small percentage of the petitions presented to the Church Court have any hope of arriving at a completely successful decision. So where does this girl stand? Her husband has deceived her, but she is not able to produce the necessary evidence to convince the Church officials of the invalidity of her marriage.

The Procedure

The Church officials will, of course, ask her many questions. How do you know he lied when he married you? How can we be sure he didn't marry you with a correct intention, but only changed afterwards? How can we be convinced that his internal intention, prior to marriage, actually influenced his consent on the day of your wedding, etc., etc.? And the girl may find herself only able to say: "I just know he didn't intend to stay with me, I just know it." She can find no witnesses; she can offer no legal proof. Once it becomes clear that she cannot prove her allegation, the Church officials are satisfied that they have done all they can. The girl finds herself stranded at a very young age to the frightening alternatives of living alone for the rest of her life, or of marrying again outside of the Church. She wants neither.

Let us suppose she meets someone else, falls in love, and marries him before a Justice of the Peace. What happens to her Catholicity? The law is clear on this point. When a Catholic divorces and remarries a Catholic outside the Church, both parties to the second marriage are excommunicated. It is explained that the penalty is me-

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dicinal rather than vindictive, i.e., the excommunication is given not to punish, but to shock the couple into a realization of the gravity of their position, hopefully to effect a breakup of this so-called sinful union.

As a result of this an unhappy practice developed. The family of the parties were often strongly urged by the priest to ostracize the couple because they were living in "sin." This kind of practice might be most unwise since not all cases are alike. It would be tragic if such a practice drove the two people into a bitter flight from Christ. Righteous indignation can easily be abused by self-righteous individuals. We would be much wiser to follow Christ's instruction, "Let him who is without sin throw the first stone."

There are so many honest mistakes made in marriage out of ignorance, fear, human weakness, that Catholics might be expected to show more compassionate concern for the welfare of those who have escaped from a hopeless, loveless marriage to seek a second chance. Many men and women, after a broken marriage, apparently find it morally impossible to live the rest of their natural lives alone. They cannot do it without falling continually into other sins of weakness. In this state of utter discouragement, they reach out for the support of a good human being to love and cherish. Given the possibility of a weak faith, or a faulty religious upbringing, or simply the inexperience of youth, the real alternatives for some people are not between a life of sin and a life of virtue. More often than not they are faced with a decision involving the lesser of two evils: namely, the fear of personal disintegration by remaining alone, or the choice of a respectable marriage partner. Some people are unable to rise to the heroism of a life spent alone.

When Christ came upon the Samaritan woman at the well at Sichar (John, IV-5-18) knowing full well her spiritual state, He told her of the living water He had for her. " 'Sir, give me this water that I may not thirst . . . ' Jesus said to her, 'Go, call your husband and come here.' The woman answered, 'I have no husband.' Jesus said to her, 'You have spoken well, for you have had five husbands and he whom you now have is not your husband. In this thou hast spoken truly.' 'Sir,' the woman said again, 'I can see that you are a prophet! Now our ancestors worshipped on this hillside but you Jews say that Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship.' "

It seems curious that Jesus who so quickly rebuked the Pharisees for their hypocrisy and who so readily rebuked the Apostles for their lack of faith, does not reject or excommunicate this woman for her immorality. Of course, it is true as a Samaritan she was already "excommunicated" from the Jewish fold, but if one presses that argument, it must be said that Christ was out of order speaking to her publicly as He did. The remarkable thing is that He chooses her, the invalidly married woman, to bear the news of His arrival. Besides complimenting her for telling the truth about her marriage, He addresses her

with the respectful title, "Woman." "Jesus said to her, 'Woman, believe me, the hour is coming when neither on this hillside nor in Jerusalem will you worship the Father . . . but the hour is coming when the true worshippers will worship the Father in spirit and truth.' " This is the first time in the gospel record that Jesus states that God is to be adored as "Father," even by the non-Jew.

According to Jewish law, this woman was an adulterous woman; she deserved absolutely no respect; she was to be condemned and stoned to death. Christ seemed to pass over the issue of her marital status as though it had no direct bearing on the primary issue of her faith in accepting the Father as God. Perhaps we would be wise to follow the example of Christ in forming our attitude toward the invalidly married. Legal rejection does not seem to be the tone of Christ, the Divine Healer, in dealing with the woman at the well.

The Pharisees were righteous men who lived dedicated lives in the service of God and the law. They were men who promoted and championed the cause of true fidelity to religious laws, and yet, Christ said to His followers: "Have nothing to do with the leaven of the Pharisees, it is all hypocrisy." These men did not expect reproach from God.

In our own day, no self-respecting churchman would care to admit that such words of reproach could be directed to himself. Each of us is certain that his conscience serves the cause of truth. Each one of us realizes that law is necessary in society and that law is a sacred instrument which upholds the values of human dignity, the rights of man. What a monstrous thing it would be if Christ turned on us, the custodians of the law, with the blazing reproach He showed the Pharisees and even His own Apostles. We can hardly imagine it. Perhaps it is because Pharisaism is such an unconscious vice, that the accusation of hypocrisy comes as such a shock. It would be at least prudent for us to admit that we might be overlooking something. Could it be that at times we are upholding the law at the expense of the beaten sinner whom Christ came to save?

But why raise the issue of Pharisaism in connection with our fidelity to the law of the Church on marriage? Perhaps because it very often happens that we do not respect the real mystery of the Sacrament of Matrimony as much as we respect the laws of the Church about marriage. To recognize a supernatural mystery is to recognize that there is much that remains veiled. The reception of any sacrament is a deeply personal encounter with Christ. The Sacrament of Penance is a prime example of personal encounter. Those who confess their sins and receive absolution from the priest encounter Christ's mercy and forgiveness, provided they are truly repentant. If they go through the motions of pious sorrow with no abiding intention to amend their lives, they are not receiving the sacrament. No one but God can fully judge such an interior action. If, externally, it ap-

pears to be a good confession, we do not question it. The priest always presumes the person is sincere.

The Sacrament of Marriage is like this. When a marriage appears externally to be a truly free mutual exchange of the vows proper to marriage, the Church presumes the couple to be joined in an indissoluble union. This is called a legal presumption. The law is reasonable in this, for men have no other way of judging external acts. But mistakes are possible. And if a mistake is made the individual is unfairly asked to suffer for the sake of an abstract concept: the protection of the marriage bond for the common good.

For instance, if a man married with the hidden intention to stay with his wife for only a little while and then leave her, he would be invalidly married in the eyes of God, although he would be validly married in the eyes of the Church. He would have to prove his defective intention in a Church court before the parties would be recognized as actually free to marry. Nevertheless, before God the marriage never was a marriage and each party would still be free.

"The conflict would be more serious if the man who simulated consent had afterwards, being really free, contracted a valid marriage with another woman. In the external forum the first woman would be considered his legitimate wife; he would be bound to live with her and forbidden to have any relations with the second one. In conscience, before God, the second woman would be his real wife and there would be no possibility of revalidating the first marriage." (Ayrinhac-Lydon, *Marriage Legislation In the New Code of Canon Law*, [Benziger Bros., Inc., New York, 1959], p. 204, cf. also Canon 1098.)

Valid, Invalid

This example of a second marriage which appears to be invalid can be referred to as a good-conscience marriage. It is valid before God, but invalid before the Church. In such a case, two serious questions arise: (1) Is it possible for the parties of such a marriage to consider themselves true members of the Church; and (2) under the circumstances would they ever be able to receive the Eucharist? Such questions cannot be answered for people in a general way; each case must be weighed individually. Nevertheless certain general observations can be made to clarify the issue.

We are certain that a person is made a member of the Church through Baptism, and by this sacrament there is given the right to receive all the other sacraments. It is a fact that the penalty of excommunication is incurred by those who attempt marriage again after civil divorce. However, the penalty of excommunication cannot be incurred by a person who has not at the same time committed a grave sin. The *ipso facto* excommunication which falls upon both the person who marries after civil divorce and the cooperating spouse must be interpreted

strictly. The penalty could not apply in a case where there was no sin committed, and it cannot be a sin to exercise one's natural right to marry if one is truly free. This is true even if society erroneously regards one as having already been married. In the case envisioned Church law merely presumes the validity of the first marriage, it does not state that this presumption of law is an incontrovertible fact or an infallible truth.

If a woman is certain that she was defrauded in such a way that her marriage was no marriage at all in the true sense, she must try to overthrow the presumption, i.e., prove her case in the Church court. If she cannot present the necessary witnesses or other proofs to accomplish this, can she be blamed for taking exception to the impersonal presumption which operates against what she knows to be the truth? Should a person in this predicament decide to marry again with a clear conscience, it is difficult to see why this act should separate her and her new spouse from God and from the Eucharistic community. The real problem arises in connection with the desire of the couple to be reconciled openly with the Catholic community, particularly the family. Under the present law of the Church, if she cannot produce solid evidence in court, there is no solution. However, for the sake of peace of conscience, such a couple is not without some remedy in law.

How could the second marriage be valid if a priest could not marry them? Naturally a priest would not be permitted to marry someone who has been previously married and who has not had that marriage annulled by the Church. Canon 1098 of the Code of Canon Law, however, offers some relief. This Canon states:

"If it is impossible without grave inconvenience to send for or to go to a pastor or Ordinary or a priest delegated by either of these to assist at a marriage, another priest who can come, should be called upon and he should assist at the marriage together with witnesses *but the marriage would be valid in the presence of the witnesses alone.*"

Here we are describing a situation where because of grave inconvenience no priest is "available" to perform the marriage rite. The classic example would be the case of the man and a woman alone on an island. There is no priest available, but the two parties are free to marry, and they want to marry. In such a case they merely exchange consent and confer the sacrament on one another. In a less dramatic setting if a priest was not available the marriage "would be valid in the presence of the witnesses alone." Couples therefore who marry before a civil official and two witnesses because no priest can marry them, have an excellent argument in this Canon to justify their belief that they have enjoyed a valid reception of the sacrament of matrimony. The essence of the sacrament is the exchange of consent, the two parties always confer the sacrament on one another.

In such a case can the parties begin to receive Holy

Communion? Canon 855 forbids those publicly known to be excommunicated from receiving. The same Canon also states that if they attempt to receive Holy Communion publicly and the priest cannot pass them by without scandal, he shall not refuse them. This canon is really a directive for the priest in the administration of the sacrament; it does not touch on the conscience problem of the recipient. If a person is inwardly well disposed to receive and is not living in sin, but is prevented from receiving because of an excommunication which is more the result of legal formalism than true justice, it seems reasonable to assume that he would only be deterred from receiving by the measure of scandal he might cause in such an act. Obviously scandal must be avoided at all costs, or the sacrament would be dishonored. But if scandal can be avoided, by the reception of the Eucharist in a parish where the parties are not known, they have every right to exercise their conscience and to unite themselves with the Lord by the reception of His Most Sacred Body and Blood.

It goes without saying that a compassionate priest should be consulted in the privacy of the confessional. The priest in this matter is a judge in the tribunal of mercy, and he can exercise his function for the Church by assisting the penitent to form a just conscience according to the circumstances of the case presented to him. This merely transfers the question from the external forum to the internal forum of the confessional. The priest can reassure the penitent that in delicate matters such as these, the private conscience can be trusted.

This whole discussion has been constructed on the premise that some invalid marriages cannot be declared null by the Church because of insufficient evidence. But equally important is the consideration that the sacred rights of the individual cannot be overlooked or diminished when the right to marry is still intact. Therefore some remedy does exist within the framework of the present law to allow people in a second marriage peace of conscience. Good people should not be deprived of true equity under the law. Our responsibility is to point out the way to freedom for the deserving case, not to conceal canonical equity as though it was an enemy of truth.

The new Dutch Catechism is a refreshing breeze in this whole field of marriage. According to the January 1967 issue of *Herder Correspondence*, the bishops of Holland had this to say in matters involving a conflict between a just law and the personal conscience: "In such cases, a thorough discussion with a prudent spiritual director can free a person from much unnecessary fear. It can even happen that a believer comes to the conclusion that his marriage does not bind him in conscience."

The whole concept of true consent is much deeper than a mere recitation of words. In ecclesiastical trials the juridical rules of evidence cannot completely measure a human act such as this. In most cases the rules are

adequate, but many times they are not. The pity of the legal approach is that in many deserving cases, in many needful cases, we do not give the benefit of the doubt to the petitioner. We demand the strictest proofs necessary for the judges to arrive at moral certainty. Unless an ecclesiastical annulment is given, the parties to the second marriage are officially placed under the public stigma of excommunication. Excommunication can be a tragic solution. It becomes an even greater tragedy in cases where the real invalidity of the first marriage was hidden from the judges in the Church trial because of some human failure on the part of the tribunal processing the case, or because of a prejudiced witness, or simply because of a lack of evidence.

The judicial arm of the Church is no different from the judicial arm of the state. It can very often be a faulty instrument of justice, not by design, but simply because it is so human and so limited.

There are many areas where the Church's law on marriage might be modified. The first suggested change would be to drop the impersonal '*ipso facto*' penalty of excommunication attached to persons who attempt a second marriage after a civil divorce. Some of these people, it is true, are simply dishonoring their marriage vows and committing adultery. Nevertheless there are many others in good faith who are living in a morally justifiable union. Excommunication implies exclusion from the Eucharistic community. "Sinners" should not be deprived of the solicitude of priests and pastors, rather, they should be encouraged to participate in every good work conducted in the parish. Christ came to save sinners. If they are truly in mortal sin, they will not escape God's judgment, but it is not for us to judge one another, even by legal presumptions. "Judge not that you be not judged." (Matt. VII, 1.)

Participation in the sacramental life of the Church is a matter of grave personal consequence for these couples, and they ought not receive the Eucharist without the guidance of a priest. An alert priest may be able to help them.

The second suggestion: the Church should change the requirement of moral certitude incumbent upon the judges in an ecclesiastic marriage trial. Even if the evidence does not convince the judges with moral certitude, if it enables them to arrive at a well-founded probability that the marriage was null, an annulment should be granted, especially in cases deserving on other grounds, such as the spiritual well-being of any children born of the second marriage. We should also accept other criteria for proof. The Roman system does not admit the testimony of the petitioner as real evidence, but other systems of law do admit the petitioner's confession of the facts. We should be more ready to accept the word of the parties. If the parties lie, they deceive no one but themselves.

The liberalization of the Church's stance in these matters should not cause an increase in the divorce rates or

a breakdown in family unity, as some argue. Our present rigid system produces about the same percentage of marriage failures as Protestants, who have a much more liberal and merciful stance with respect to broken marriages.

There are no easy answers to such complex issues. Too many married persons think of themselves first and their children later. This is deplorable selfishness. But many others have departed their spouse precisely to save themselves and their children. We can only pray that the merciful love of God will reach the hearts of those who read

these thoughts so that they will be understood in the Spirit of truth. The law must not become a stumbling block for sinners, it must be a support for society. "The canonical practice of equity is based on respect for men's rights and on the dignity of the human person; in particular the canon law protects the free exercise and decision of the will and defends the individual conscience against all excesses of legal formalism." (*Osservatore Romano*, April 3, 1959, in an article entitled, "Lo Spirito del Diritto Canonico," by Vincent Fagiolo.)



"Traditional Church discipline has become untenable because it no longer has anything to do with the present social reality . . . the assumptions of ecclesiastical laws have nothing to do with marriage as we now understand it."

DIVORCE: NO LONGER UNTHINKABLE

ROSEMARY RUETHER

The present church discipline on divorce is intolerable; of that many of us are convinced. But rethinking the present position toward a fuller presentation is not an easy task. The difficulties do not reside simply with ecclesiastical laws. Our civil divorce laws are equally the product of doubtful values, and they create and perpetuate perjury and hypocrisy in the court rooms. Trumped-up legal charges and exorbitant fees unnecessarily complicate the divorce procedure. The whole legal casuistry of "grounds" for divorce has little relationship to the social reality whose only real grounds is the incompatibility of the relationship itself. The notion that such laws deter divorce is highly questionable. What they do accomplish is a vicious compounding of the emotional conditions surrounding the divorce, making it the more difficult for the partners to leave the marriage with an equitable settlement and a mature evaluation of the actual causes of failure. Equally unwarranted is the assumption that people seek divorce for frivolous reasons and easier divorce would accelerate this trend. The experience of marriage counselors points to the opposite conclusion. In our society, where marriage is the norm, divorce is

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an unappetizing prospect, and most couples endure great and even excessive tribulation before they finally give up.

It is essential that we begin our rethinking of this problem by exorcising the myth that divorce constitutes a threat to our present concept of the family. Moralistic rhetoric would have us believe that, at some vague era in the past, a familial idyll prevailed, and the sanctity and inviolability of the family as we now know it were the unchallenged pillars of society. Our rising divorce rates are then presented as the degeneration from this golden age. However, knowledge of social history indicates that our present notion of the family, upon which these appeals to home and motherhood are based, is a recent one which became possible only with the privatizing of marriage and the new idea of the child that began to arise during the 18th century. In an earlier period marriage was a multifunctional socio-economic institution and had little to do with these personal values. The whole concept of child-rearing as an intensive project of the family, engaging the wife as a full-time occupation, would have seemed incredible before our present period. Children in earlier societies were left very much to fend for themselves and grew up higgledy-piggledy among the extended family, servants, children of servants and older siblings. Lower-class parents were too busy

with the many economic tasks upon which their existence depended to waste much time with the psychology of their children. The whole concept of childhood as a special process is a modern novelty. So the two most distinctive characteristics of modern marriage, intense emotional relationship between the spouses and conscious dedication to child-rearing, are specifically modern traits which had only a minor role in the institution of marriage before the 19th century.

Our present divorce trends, far from threatening this concept of marriage, are the condition which makes this use of marriage possible. Now that practically all the productive functions which once characterized marriage—food and goods production, political alliances—have fled from this institution to other spheres, marriage loses its public character and survives today primarily as an interpersonal relationship. Divorce is the escape hatch which makes possible this use of marriage for a purpose for which it is, in some ways, rather poorly adapted. Only by keeping open the back door of divorce, are we able to maintain unchallenged a view of marriage that is almost impossibly overloaded with expectations of interpersonal fulfillment.

The traditional ecclesiastical discipline on marriage has become untenable because it no longer has anything to do with the present social reality of marriage. Stemming from a period when marriage was really a public institution, it views the marital bond in legal terms and not in interpersonal terms. Marriage is understood as an inviolable contract. The sacramentalizing of this contractual relationship has the function chiefly of absolutizing it, of making its interminability an expression of the "will of God." Only when it is clear that this law understands marriage as a legal contract and not as a personal community is it possible to understand why it considers the bond to remain in force long after the relationship has terminated. In a public, institutional view of marriage the validity of the bond rests on the validity of the legal contract and has nothing to do with the ethics of authentic community. In other words the assumptions of the ecclesiastical marriage laws have nothing to do with marriage as we now understand it. The validity of the marriage rests on the validity of the relationships which make it a viable context for personal development. Once the relationships have become destructive beyond repair, then the *raison d'être* of the marriage ceases to exist.

But what about the task of rearing children, even granted that it is a recent obsession? Surely this gives the family a public role and responsibility that should carry it beyond the question of 'mere' personal compatibility? This seems a valid objection. Many marriages today, in fact, are kept together solely for the sake of providing a united home for the rearing of the children. That this is their sole function becomes clear when the parents immediately divorce as soon as the child-raising task is over.

But even this consideration is an ambiguous one. The marriage relationship today is so exclusively defined by the personal community of the spouses that once this community becomes destructive, it can scarcely provide a good context for rearing children. The extended family, the productive tasks which once served as buffers between the personal relationships of the members are gone. The personal community of the parents completely draws into itself and defines the project of child-rearing. Once this personal community becomes negative, it is doubtful whether the child profits from keeping the relationship together for his sake. The children will be torn apart in any case, but they are sure to be torn apart in a combative and hatefilled household. They may possibly have a chance of a happier atmosphere in a household built by one partner apart from the immediate tension with the other.

Theology of Community

There are no longer any purely public tasks that can carry marriage along. Interpersonality defines the entire marriage project and interpersonality can be constructive or destructive, but never merely neutral. Our ecclesiastical discipline has become immoral because it is not an ethic for marriage as it presently exists. This does not mean that there is nothing meaningful that can be said to this present marital situation, but it must be an ethic that takes into consideration its social actuality. To do so the church must give up the legal contractual approach. A meaningful church discipline for marriage today must be constructed around a theology and ethics of interpersonal community. Church discipline should be directed positively toward the sustaining of interpersonal community and the evaluation of interpersonality in the light of the gospel. It can no longer operate over against the divorced person as a bar to remarriage.

There has been considerable literature on the theology of community, but this work has focused on the nature of the church. There has also been much development toward a more personalist understanding of marriage. The pastoral theology of marriage that I would envision would bring these two areas together so that the communal dilemma of marriage could be judged in the light of the church as the community of the New Creation. The kind of development I have in mind would go beyond the compass of an article, but a brief sketch can perhaps outline the shape of thinking that is in view.

The theological component of this discussion would follow the lines of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's thought. In Bonhoeffer we have a developed theology of community and broken community. The ground of our creational life with God, for Bonhoeffer, is community with our created fellow man. The husband-wife relationship is the original paradigm of life with God which finds its restored image in the church, the Christological community. The ground

of the Fall is broken community and is marked by alienation and exploitive relationships. Alienation and exploitation of others manifests a state of being in which man has made himself the ground of his own existence, thereby losing his ground in God. Instead of accepting the ground of his existence as a gift, man seizes his existence as his own possession. Hence his existence becomes self-enclosed, defined by the *cor curvum in se*. Loss of relationship with God expresses itself concretely in broken community with a fellow creature. The self-enclosed man can no longer exist for others, but makes all others exist for him. The other person in his "otherness" as God's child, an otherness which puts him ultimately beyond our grasp, is reduced to an immediacy as the object of desire for the enhancement of the ego. This is the expression of *eros* as it has become corrupted by *hubris* under the fallen mode of being. *Eros* itself is the natural expression of our need and dependence on each other. *Eros* corrupted by *hubris* becomes self-enclosed, valuing others only for their utility to the self-fulfillment of the desiring ego.

God's New Creation in Christ means the breaking apart of this self-enclosed heart which cannot be present for others, but can only stretch out to others to fill its own lack. Christ as the man for others is the fountainhead of renewed community. The ground of this new community is the revelation of a new principle of love, a love which accepts the other gratuitously, and does not value him on the basis of his ability to gratify. It is a love which is not self-enhancing, but gives itself away freely and in so doing creates value in the one who is loved. This redeeming love involves a total conversion for us, a turning around from the principle of life out of which we presently live. Furthermore, this new principle of life is given to us from beyond ourselves and is known from the point of view of God's self-giving love in behalf of us. We find ourselves able to live out of this new principle of life as an act of faith rather than as an innate power in our present possession. This means that our present existence continues to be marked by the sign of the self-enclosed heart. We all stand before God as men who have broken trust with each other and yet are sought by God. It is the mission of the church to proclaim this status of man. This means that the church is defined primarily as the community of acceptance; the place where man, even in the midst of his failure to keep faith with his fellow, finds that God nevertheless keeps faith with him.

A Christian theology of marriage should incorporate the marital relationship into this understanding of broken community and the gift of Christological community under the sign of faith. Because marriage has become for us the central expression of interpersonality (as was not the case in earlier periods), it has become the intensive center manifesting the ambiguity of man's existence. Man's historical being lies in tension between his broken Adamic being and his expectation of Christ. As marriage becomes the central expression of man's interpersonality,

it more than ever is incorporated into the symbol of the church. The church stands for the community of the New Creation, but this power for community is possessed in faith. It is possessed as a reality that lies ahead of us as men who, here and now, constantly reveal our inability to fulfill this hope. We live between the principles of *eros* and *agape*, between the mode of being which holds us to our past and a breaking in of a mode of being that opens us to the future. The life force of our present state operates as a prolongation of itself seeking its own self-fulfillment, and it is as persons taken by surprise that we find ourselves freely accepted by others. The natural love is the love of *eros*, the love which springs from need. The revelation of a new principle of love, the love which God has for men, sets this erotic elan toward self-fulfillment in a larger framework. Within this larger framework of agapic love we discover that the very ability to gratify each other rests on a modality of community the principle of which is free acceptance and not self-enhancement. Only within this framework can the partners really be at ease to serve each other, because only this can establish a framework of trust which assures us that we are accepted for better or for worse, in our failure as well as in our success. Only by setting erotic community within the embrace of agapic community can interpersonality in marriage be saved from degenerating into exploitive relationship where the other is valued only so long as he pleases and is to be thrown aside when unable to fulfill one's desire.

Proclaiming God's Acceptance

What happens when this larger framework is not realized? What happens when the ethic of self-fulfillment becomes the dominant measure of the marriage, and in that measure the relationship is found wanting? What does the church have to say at this point? First of all, the church must see that this breakdown is not some shocking occurrence for which it has no explanation from the gospel. Rather is it an occurrence about which the church itself should have the inside clue. The church's mission is nothing else but the proclamation of God's acceptance of us despite all our failure to keep faith with each other. So the word of the church to the partners of a broken marriage cannot be one of rejection, but must be one of pastoral concern expressive of the church's own nature as the community of ultimate acceptance. There really can be no situation in which the church can speak only a word of rejection, for it is the community, not of the righteous, but of the accepted sinner. This is the Word of God out of which the church's word must live. The church cannot stand between God and the broken person as a barrier, but the church is there to mediate God's acceptance of the broken person as the principle out of which the church herself lives.

But this does not mean that the church can be a community of "cheap grace" either. To avoid this the disci-



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
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pline of the church must be meaningful. Grace and judgment, forgiveness and repentance are interdependent. But this does not mean that we are accepted on the condition of repentance as a kind of "good work" by which we earn forgiveness. The process is really the reverse. Grace is God's gift out of which we find the power to judge ourselves truthfully. The pastoral discipline of the church should be directed toward an expression of acceptance which helps the persons toward truthful self-knowledge. A pastoral discipline for marriage would operate most profitably in two areas. First, it should operate in the period of preparation for marriage, a period which we have only begun to take seriously with groups like the Cana Conferences. Such preparation for marriage would try to awaken the prospective partners to an honest evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of their relationship and their true ability to create a good community with each other. Perhaps it would be necessary to apply an ultimate sanction of refusal of church marriage to a couple which seems seriously unable to sustain a valid commitment. A group counseling situation where the couple works with clergy and older married people would pre-

vent this judgment from being merely arbitrary or legalistic, but an expression of pastoral concern. Secondly the church should create mandatory structures for the counseling of relationships which are in difficulty. This kind of counseling would be directed toward the maturing of relationships which have potential for continued community. When, in the process of counseling, the possibility for authentic relationship appears so lacking that no viable future for the couple is in sight, then the guidance should be directed, not to forcing the couple to remain together, but rather toward breaking the bonds of egoism and mutual accusation with which the partners seek to clothe themselves and making them face truthfully the personal responsibility for the failure. If serious church discipline really operated in these two areas, it would be possible, with no loss of seriousness toward the marriage relationship, to drop altogether the present casuistry of remarriage, and allow anyone to remarry within the church who, having really come to terms with their previous failure and their potential for a good relationship with the new partner, seems capable of starting afresh in an authentic way.



"One must view marriage not merely as a mutual commitment of the couple to each other, for their own good, but rather as their common dedication to a good beyond themselves, greater than both of them, a reality uniting the devotion of both."

RATIONAL ETHICS SAYS 'NO'

GERMAIN G. GRISEZ

Divorce can be considered from many points of view. What leads to it, and what are its consequences? What laws govern it? What has theology to say about its ultimate meaning? I shall not tackle all of these questions. Instead, I wish to consider only this one: Is divorce morally wrong?

In considering this question, I do not wish to pass judgment on divorced persons. Subjective factors qualify the objective morality of acts. The question is whether the act of divorce is wrong objectively, not whether the di-

vorced person is vicious. My remarks will only indicate in a very sketchy way the ethical consideration I think this question requires. I have never tried to think the matter through, and so what I will say about it is quite tentative. Having no competence in theology, scriptural exegesis, or church history, I shall confine myself almost entirely to arguments based on a merely rational ethics.

There are several levels on which an ethical consideration of divorce can proceed. The lowest is that of simple utilitarianism. At this level, I think it is pretty generally agreed that divorce is a human ill, that it is a problem, a symptom of something wrong, an unfortunate (if sometimes necessary) way out of problems that arise in mar-

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riage. Divorce is viewed pretty much as war is viewed: neither is good in itself, either may become necessary as a last resort.

Why does a utilitarian ethic take so dim a view of a practice as widespread as divorce? Even without considering the consequences of divorce, a utilitarian can observe that for most men stable marriage is an ideal, and the commonness of this judgment can be taken as a distillation of experience. But the utilitarian can also call upon experienced consequences. Divorce is a major upheaval in anyone's life. It often causes psychological damage to all concerned, especially to the children. It does not always solve personal problems, and sometimes even increases them. A dancer who stumbles from ineptitude does not become any more skillful by changing partners.

A utilitarian also may point out that the very possibility of divorce weakens every marital bond. In the past, a common utilitarian argument was that divorce weakened the foundations of society. This argument has force, however, only to the extent that society is built on stable families—something less true today than it was in former ages.

Beyond Utilitarianism

Still, the utilitarian judgment on divorce would be at least generally negative. But not universally so, I think. To advance beyond utilitarianism, we must take a personalistic view of human relationships. This is the view of some non-believers, and of a great many Christians and Jews. On this view, divorce is not merely a human ill, but it is a moral evil. However, it may at times be allowable because of the demands of other *moral* obligations.

From this personalistic point of view, marriage cannot be considered a mere contract. It is a pledge of love, and a bond arising from this pledge and certifying it. Such love seeks development, but development is a steady and continuous unfolding, not a flux detached from every stable principle. Consequently, love itself requires permanence. Only envy of love sets up change as an idol.

Marriage is not a proper field for experimentation. One can experiment with *things*, for one thing can replace another. But one must not experiment with *persons*, for each person is irreplaceable. Human life is not subject to use and disposability; it is not what we *have*, but what we *are*. No two segments of our life can ever have comparable meaning and value. Therefore, it is impossible to abandon an effort that involves our very life, and to start again fresh. There are no such fresh starts for us, only for the things that do not matter.

One cannot limit in advance one's commitment in a human relationship without killing the possibility of genuine communication. Any marriage is entered into by

persons who are young and immature, however old and mature they may be. Everyone who has ever married has discovered subsequently that he is engaged in something more than he bargained for. And marriage is always a disillusioning experience. In fact, marriage is one long series of disillusionments—or else it is a complete disaster—for one only grows out of illusions and into reality by a long and painful process.

Since marriage is not an objective fact, but a personal interrelationship, there is no way to determine whether a marriage has "broken down." "Break-down" is an observable fact where machines are concerned; it even makes sense where the health of the organism is in question. But in human relationships, "break-down" is merely a label for despair. If a couple are *willing* to try again, their relationship has not broken down. If they are not willing, this is not merely another fact, alongside the malfunction of their automatic washing machine.

From a personalistic point of view, a human life is not merely a sequence of events, a kind of "true story." It is not really observable from without at all, not even by the person whose life it is. Instead, life is a fundamental commitment, and a nesting of other commitments and acts within the fundamental one. The ultimate value of life is determined by the quality of the fundamental commitment.

A good life is not a commitment to what is generally called "happiness," nor to any other definite, particular good. A good life is a commitment to a quest, a search for one's true self, a search for pure love and perfect truth.

In the context of this concept of life as a commitment to a quest, marriage appears in a light altogether higher than that in which the utilitarian sees it. For marriage is a genuine community of life. It is the mutual inclusion of man and woman within the interiority of the self whose true reality is sought through the quest which is the common life of both. To attempt a divorce is not simply to break a bond, it is to try to cut off part of oneself. It is to commit existential suicide, to kill the one person in whom the two are joined.

As life progresses, as illusions are overcome, husband and wife must constantly alter the expectations with which they entered their married life. They cannot quit simply because their expectations are not fulfilled. Rather, they must sacrifice their expectations, for growth demands adjustment. A person who is unhappy with his mate will, of course, require a different mate, unless he becomes a different person.

To this personalistic point of view, it may be argued that the same things hold for other friendships as for marriage. After all, marriage is not the only genuine friendship. Yet we do not object to allowing other friendships to lapse, nor even to breaking them off when mutuality ceases. Why should marriage be so exceptional?

At the level of the personalistic argument, it can be

pointed out that marriage is peculiarly intimate and total. Other friendships do not form such complete, natural complements of the whole person; other friendships are not so central to the commitment which constitutes the life of a person. The very fact that permanent unity in married love is seen as an ideal, even by many who look at the relationship from a purely utilitarian viewpoint, seems to indicate that this sort of relationship constitutes a full community of life as no other friendship does. Thus, while the termination of other friendships may somewhat disrupt life, divorce seems to tear life apart much more profoundly.

A Moral Demand

I think that personalistic considerations along these lines have some validity, but I do not see that they provide a cogent argument that divorce is wrong in every instance. The real problem concerning the morality of divorce does not arise simply from the fact that someone might arbitrarily consider initiating it. Rather, the problem becomes most difficult only when there seems to be a *moral* demand that a marriage be broken, or a *moral* demand that an injured partner carry on as well as possible in a new relationship. What is one to say about cases in which attempts to continue a marriage seem to harm everyone concerned, including especially the children? What is one to say about cases in which a person cut out for marriage is abandoned, perhaps with children who need two parents, not one part-time parent?

When we ask whether it is not eventually justified to break up a marriage for which there is no hope, we must first determine how the calculation is made that there is *no hope*. Where there's life, there's hope—and even this maxim is a counsel of despair. For hope goes beyond life. A human life that is ruled by mere facts, such as past experience and the expectation of death, is hardly worth living, for it is hardly human.

Of course, it is quite another question whether a couple ought not sometimes continue their marriage in separation from each other. A woman whose husband is a philanderer need not let herself be used as home base between adventures; fidelity to the marriage itself demands that she resist being abused in this way. A man whose wife beats the children half to death may be obliged to break up the home to save his own commitment, as well as to save the children's hides.

When we ask about injured, innocent parties, we must ask who is innocent. Ethically, one cannot deny that there may be cases in which one partner is totally innocent, and the other really at fault. If such cases are examined very carefully, however, there may be some doubt as to whether the party who is at fault ever intended to commit himself in marriage in the first place. Perhaps the real intent was only to carry on a temporary, advantageous relationship. Such a thing might be im-

possible to prove, but if marriage is a mutual commitment, it cannot exist if the commitment is not real and really mutual.

But to see why divorce is wrong in every instance, I think, we must go beyond these considerations. To see why a person who has been abandoned, whose marriage by all human standards holds out no hope for revitalization, whose partner already has remarried—to see why such a person must remain faithful to a marriage that seems utterly destroyed, we must see that divorce is not only morally evil but even metaphysically impossible. One who attempts to remarry after divorce will surely be doing what is wrong in every instance only if divorce is not actually possible in any instance.



Yet if marriage is a mutual commitment of the couple themselves, how can this commitment be absolutely indestructible? Cannot they, who have the power to bind themselves, loose themselves as well?

To answer this question, it seems to me, one must view marriage not merely as a mutual commitment of the couple to each other, for their own good, but rather as their common dedication to a good beyond themselves. They are not united except through communion in something that is, in a way, greater than both of them.

This good beyond the couple themselves must not be an abstraction; it must be a reality. Not a reality *possessed* in common, but a reality uniting the devotion of both. Not face to face, but side by side, the two of them become "we two." And out of "we two" comes the true *I* and *thou*.

The unity of marriage has its foundation in such a reality beyond the couple themselves. In the child, the two really become one flesh, and that is true only in the child, who is truly one, and truly the flesh of both. Not as an accomplished fact, indeed, but at least as a beloved hope, the child is necessary if communion in marital love is to be possible at all. (And *hope* does not know about mere facts such as sterility and old age.)

At the same time, the permanence of marriage is necessary for the child. To give life is not simply to copulate. It is to give all the beginnings, all that a human being can receive from others, or, at least, the beginning of all the beginnings. Thus the gift of life takes time, and parents must cooperate together for many years.

But what if there are no children? What if a new marriage seems better for the children? These would be telling objections if marriage were a mere contract to produce something, if marriage were like a business partnership. But one cannot contract to *make* a child. The coming to be of a human person is not the result of production; there is no art or technique proportionate to this process.

The child is not a limited, predefined, particular objective to be attained by limited, predefined, particular means. He is not the result of a nine-month plan nor even of a twenty-one-year plan. He is not the result of a plan at all. He goes beyond all planning. For planning always knows in advance the meaning of what is to be accomplished. But the child means more than his parents could ever know. His meaning, like all of human life, is determined by the absolutely transcendent.

That is why a man and a woman who would be parents really must unite their lives together. The cooperation that is required of them is the union of their lives into one life, for the child is the continuation of that life. The necessity for this union, due to the fact that the child is immeasurable in meaning and value, is the basis for the peculiar fidelity of marriage. In marrying, a man and a woman commit themselves to more than they can know. That is why they cannot withdraw their commitment: they can never know that which transcends them, which has bound them together. Their violation of the love that should bind them together is real, but it does not dissolve the unity in which they are joined.

Of course, those who accept contraception will not assent to an argument formulated along these lines. For the admission of contraception denies the moral link between sexual intercourse and the beginning of life. Marriage can then be redefined in such a way that it will not receive from the child a reality that transcends calculable goods and the wills of the partners themselves. Of course, marriage may still have something to do with children. But children will be objects of the benevolence of the married couple, not fruit of their one life. And contraceptive marriage *need not* have anything to do with children at all. It can as well be a partnership in view of any other good, so long as an intimate relationship between a man and a woman can be conducive to the attainment of that good.

But let us set aside the position implied by the concept of marriage that underlies the approval of contraception. And let us accept, for the moment, the argument that marriage, defined by reference to the person of the child, is sealed by something transcendent that gives the life of the child its full personal meaning and value. On this ground, can there be any room whatsoever for the dissolution of marriage? I think there are even still certain possibilities that *some* marriages could be dissolved.

In the first place, there is the matter of consummation.

Have a couple fully committed themselves to marriage when they pronounce their marriage vows? Or is the commitment really only completely definite when they have begun to fulfill the distinctive life of marriage? This problem is a complex one, and its clarification depends on an understanding of the notions of *consent* and *promise*. I think that marriage must be consummated, but I also think that *any* mutual act that is *peculiar* to conjugal life is sufficient to consummate marriage.

In the second place, there is the imperfect but real marriage. Can a couple who do not intend to form an indissoluble union actually bind themselves absolutely? I do not think so. But must a couple understand why marriage is indissoluble in order to bind themselves absolutely? Again, I think not. It seems to me that the essential factor in *limiting* the commitment is the couple's intent. Yet I think that marriage with a limited commitment, entered into by sincere and upright persons who do not appreciate fully what marriage ought to be, nevertheless is a true, though imperfect, union.

In the third place, there is the question whether some more fundamental commitment may not take precedence over even a perfect and consummated marriage. The absoluteness of the marriage bond arises from the fact that this unity, defined by reference to the child, is sealed by the absolutely transcendent which gives the child his immeasurable meaning and value as a person. If this transcendent directly requires the most fundamental commitment of human life, if it determines the whole meaning of one's entire life, may it not supersede even the marriage bond itself? It seems that the sacred itself could dissolve even the most sacrosanct of human bonds. But this, of course, assumes that what is absolute and transcendent can make personal demands upon us—something philosophically doubtful, that can be held as true only by faith.

These reflections, as I said at the outset, are tentative. As a Catholic, I believe what the Catholic Church teaches concerning marriage and divorce. As a philosopher, I can speculate about divorce, but I do not believe such speculation can exhaust what faith teaches about the mystery of sacramental marriage.

To be frank, I must also say that I do not believe the Catholic Church's teaching concerning the indissolubility of sacramental, consummated marriage is subject to change. For many couples, the necessary is possible. I wish that these couples were not going to be scandalized by attempts to "develop" the Catholic teaching on divorce, but I suppose that such scandal must be given.

Christ restored marriage to what it had been in the beginning. What sort of progress would it be now to restore it to the condition in which Christ found it among the Pharisees who read the Law of Moses? God in Christ has indissolubly bound Himself to man. By the Law of Christ marriage signifies this communion, and encloses within it the compact of conjugal love.

THE STAGE

Off-Broadway continues in decline. For want of imagination we are given moralities, for want of art, theses—all in perverse violation of Kerr's Law (1955), and its corollaries. Three recent openings contribute to this decline.

Arnold Weinstein, whose garland of conceits, "Red Eye of Love," so delighted us several seasons ago, and whom we've been looking around every corner for ever since, has been importuned by his colleagues to write an anti-war play, and the truth of the matter is, his heart isn't in it. This kind of tract requires militant convictions and a bellicosity which he simply doesn't have. Even the lyrics lose heart, repeatedly diminishing into the weak form of the feminine rhyme. The effect is contagious, I fear, for even the performance is dispirited.

"Dynamite Tonite" poses two tattered soldiers in the stasis of a long war, one a by-the-numbers officer, the other a benumbed *Schweik* or *Johnny Johnson*. Delivered into their custody is an enemy soldier, whose dreams of his beloved materialize before our eyes. It is she who brings the wayward action to a halt when she comes to tell the news of an armistice, and is mistakenly killed by the officer.

William Bolcom's mocking score begins like Lotte Lenya coming on strong, and segues adroitly into a shag or a soft shoe, as the moment may require. But it is so well integrated that it cannot surmount the play.

There is, to be sure, some fine syllabification in the alien prisoner's vocables, and a moving lament by a blind soldier. But "Dynamite Tonite" is a misapplication of talent, and a powerful waste of powder and shot. (*Closed at the Martinique.*)

In "Not a Way of Life," James Rush, St. John's, '51, carries *aggiornamento* to the point of no ecclesiastical return.

The audience is hardly seated when the thesis is tossed into its lap: in the first of three confessional scenes Anne is telling the priest that her husband, apostate "till they start having black masses," is using contraceptives, and that the dilemma of uxorial love v. moral conscience is tearing her apart.

We needn't have been told that this is the author's first dramatic construction, for it is patent carpentry, the work of an artisan, not an artist. Mr. Rush balances his equation by adding an old-school priest ("Make a novena!") and a young radical one ("God is dead!"). So neatly is this polarity of forces arranged that in the confrontation scene the young priest and the apostate are chumming it cordially when the old priest and the wife

walk into the house. It is not surprising that the author loses control here, or that the scene evades crux, peripeteia, anagnorisis, climax and resolution—in short, drama—by the barefaced expedient of having the telephone ring. Whereupon, the lights dim, in order that the obligatory scene may have time to occur offstage, then come up again and for the last time on the confessional, with a now radiant wife declaring that her marriage is happy, her conscience clear, and she has nothing to confess.

On the other hand, the author is careful to lend the old priest the aspect of fairness by equipping him with a stock dialectic; but on the other, lest we be deceived about the side on which truth lies, he introduces a second couple who do not practice birth control, and whose ninth child causes the derangement of the wife and coincides with the loss of the husband's job. It never rains but it pours on all dumb fools.

The messages are neat, too: the moribund Church is already being inseminated by ardent young priests of the situational ethics schools, and the canon of the future will be determined by a subjective and practical majority. (*At the Sheridan Square*)

"Chocolates" has a moral in it somewhere, but Ian Bernard has been smart enough to disguise it by ambiguity, *à l'avant mode*.

The theme of the individual's failure "to belong" is straight out of O'Neill, but the method is a crosshatch of Richardson's "Gallows Humor" and Ionesco's "The Killer," complete to the existentialist anti-hero, a schnook by the pregnant name of Prale. One day Prale awakens in a psychopathic cell controlled by two grinning executors of the System, who seem to know every secret and whose power is practically absolute. They are dedicated to the proposition that individualists and non-conformists are threats to the System and therefore must be made to knuckle under, or be hounded to destruction.

Corruption of the individual is achieved by the blandishments of the System—food and sex, to be direct. "I almost had it made," Prale reminisces, thinking of how he was first seduced by and gorged himself on a bagful of chocolates. But this does not bear transliteration: what a prodigious people mightn't we be, but for our carnality! It is especially unworkable in the case of Prale, a sponge whose individualism is composed in equal parts of indifference and egoism.

When Prale's shrewish wife comes to do her duty by him in his cell, he strangles her. The System cannot afford such embarrassment, so Prale is sent forth, to dispose of his wife's body as he pleases. Then through chance he becomes involved with two successive women: an unrepressed kook who sculpts with bubble gum and makes wheat germ soufflé; and a clinging-vine widow. But poor Prale has been hooked on the System, and ends up where he began, in his solitary cell.

The second and third acts of the roundelay are refreshed with humor, some bawdy and some outlandish. But what, in sum, can be said, except that those lackluster qualities which endeared the anti-hero to the producer are the intrinsic cause of the play's failure. (*Reviewed at Gramercy Arts Theatre.*) WILLIAM TALBOT

FUN—WITH MUSIC

THE SCREEN

The prospect of an *original* musical-comedy movie is always heartening. And no doubt producer Ross Hunter, scriptwriter Richard Morris, and everyone else connected with "Thoroughly Modern Millie" meant to do an *original*, set in the twenties, and telling the story of a small-town girl who's determined to be modern, get a secretarial job in the big city, and marry a rich boss. But somehow, during the growth of "Millie," its makers began to rely so heavily on the corn and clichés of old movies (including Sennett chases, Harold Lloyd acrobatics, and a melodramatic plot about innocent girls being kidnapped into white slavery) that their picture became one big campy satire on the clothes, attitudes, and slang of the twenties.

This isn't necessarily bad. "Millie" may not be as original as its makers think; but it is still very entertaining. And it has many points in its favor, especially a good cast who come through well in the fun department. Julie Andrews, taking herself a little less seriously than usual, is fine as the girl who's trying so hard to be modern in 1922 and snag her well-heeled boss. Carol Channing is the merry widow who's living life to the fullest and gives out with such popular songs as "Jazz Baby" and "Do It Again" to prove her point. And the incomparable Beatrice Lillie adds fun to every scene she steals as the house mother who traps victims for the white slavers. James Fox is properly handsome and boyish as the tennis-anyone? youth who teaches Millie "The Tapioca" and even climbs the walls of her office building to win her. And John Gavin is absolutely perfect as Millie's stuffy, Arrow-Collar boss.

While the new songs written for "Millie" aren't particularly startling, Elmer Bernstein's score that uses many old tunes is quite pleasant. And some of the tricks are a delight, as when tired, job-hunting Millie first sees Gavin, and the sound track blares out with the Hallelujah Chorus which is blended with Julie Andrews' singing of "Baby Face"; or the later scene in which Gavin and Millie's friend (Mary Tyler Moore as a musical comedy nothing type) fall in love at first sight and give out with "Ah, Sweet Mystery of Life." Director George Roy Hill, trying no doubt to recover from his last debacle, "Hawaii," and

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
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to get in as much of his charming "World of Henry Orient" as possible, really strives to keep "Millie" on the light side. Although the movie is too long and its pretentious camping gets a touch tiresome, "Millie" has plenty of bright moments to keep audiences amused.

Even funnier is "How To Succeed in Business Without Really Trying." And the amazing thing about this is that producer-director-scriptwriter David Swift made very little effort to turn this highly successful 1961 stage musical comedy into a *movie*. Since the plot is mainly concerned with J. Pierpont Finch, a baby-faced, determinedly-ambitious opportunist who can even turn his mistakes to his advantage as he progresses from window washer to chairman of the board in this back-biting, back-slapping, step-over-everyone, dog-eat-dog world of business, "How To Succeed" might have become an imaginative movie-kind-of-movie like "The Knack" in its transference to the screen. But no; director Swift does most of the scenes and even the production numbers in an old-fashioned stagey sort of way. Perhaps he was right. The original show was so funny that even the static movie is a laff riot and the satire on how men—and women—behave in business is just as biting on the large screen.

Much of the credit should go to Robert Morse—and to Swift for guiding Morse in his best film performance

to date. With his darling, mama's boy face, Morse looks like the kind of a young man you'd pat on the head as he knifed you. (I'd like to see him play a really evil character sometime.) As Pierpont he's very funny, and you laugh at him because most of the people around him are equally vicious and calculating, but helped by his charm and good luck, he outsmarts them. As his none-too-bright boss, Rudy Vallee does a first-rate caricature; and so does Maureen Arthur as the boss' girlfriend. Michele Lee is lovely as the girl who's attracted to Pierpont and sings "I Believe In You" to him—a song that is used brilliantly later when Pierpont sings it to himself. The supporting cast throughout is good and sing Frank Loesser's music and clever lyrics so you can hear them. Cinematic "How To Succeed" may not be, but it may turn out to be the funniest movie of the year.

I wish I could say some nice things about the new Chaplin movie, mainly because I think he is one of the greatest movie makers of all times. But "A Countess from Hong Kong" is so old-fashioned and dull that one can hardly believe it was made now. Sophia Loren is quite attractive at times as the dance hall girl who hides in Marlon Brando's suite on a luxury liner to escape from Hong Kong, and Brando is lethargic as the not-yet-divorced diplomat who doesn't want to get involved; so the two of them spend most of their time running coyly from parlor to bedroom to bath. The running, the dialogue, and even the score Chaplin wrote are incredible. Most times the cast, including Sydney Chaplin and Tippi Hedren just look pained as if they were asked to perform in one of those outmoded and superficial plays of the twenties like "Getting Gertie's Garter" or "Parlor, Bedroom and Bath." No wonder dead-panned Brando says at one point, "I didn't smile; that was a gas pain." It probably really was.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

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country gentlemen and city business- ways been attra

St. Martin's, \$12.50

Victorian England invented, among many other useful objects, the political biography, those vast, leisurely studies, loaded with public documents and private letters, parliamentary addresses and intimate conversations, diaries and journals and memoranda of all sorts. The genre's two greatest monuments are the three huge volumes of Morley's *Gladstone* and the six huge volumes of Monypenny and Buckle's *Disraeli*. Set a few weeks aside and read these two perfectly contrasting studies, and Victorian England lies all before you.

In 1845 Disraeli was forty, with some gamey years behind him and a very thin hope of Tory leadership ahead. The Queen shrank from even meeting him. Hardly anybody in the House of Commons trusted him. He was, in Blake's words, considered "an insolent, mysterious, half-foreign adventurer with a libertine past and a load of debt, who had married a rich widow for money." Yet within thirty years he was (though still heavily in debt) the Earl of Beaconsfield, twice Prime Minister of England, the idol of a revitalized Tory party, its

So many aspects of Disraeli's life and work call for attention, his letters, for example, his political writings, his career as a best-selling novelist, his Jewishness (where Sir Cecil Roth has probably said the last word). Someone might even write a good book on Disraeli and Catholicism.

In 1845 Disraeli made one of his most brilliant speeches to attack Peel's proposal to treble the grant for Maynooth, the Irish Catholic Seminary that the Whig Macaulay had referred to contemptuously as a "miserable Do-the-Boys Hall." But such actions were political maneuverings, going against the grain of Disraeli's predispositions. He had al-

But Disraeli the Tory was fascinated with Catholicism for quite other reasons, its associations with the oldest English land-owning aristocracy. His novels for example, are full of names like Dacre, Arundel, Vavasour, Trafford, Tichborne—the names of the old recusant families, who combined aristocratic lineage, attachment to the land, and solidly authoritarian politics. Disraeli, too, in his Young England phase, preached the High Tory historical view of the breakdown of the monastic estates at the Reformation as the source of England's economic and social woes.

“By the bye, have you any news of the Monsignor?”

'He is in Ireland, arranging about the Oecumenical Council. They do not understand these matters there as well as we do in England, and his Holiness, by the Cardinal's advice, has sent the Monsignor to put things right.'

'All the Father Colemans in the world cannot alter the state of affairs about mixed marriages,' said Lothair, 'they can explain, but they cannot alter. I want change in this matter, and Rome never changes.'

'It is impossible for the Church to change,' said Lady St. Jerome, 'because it is Truth.'

Two Views

UWE JOHNSON

Harcourt, Brace, \$4.50

JUDITH SKLAR

Uwe Johnson's *Two Views* is about the escape of an East German girl into West Berlin, but it could hardly resemble Michael Caine's exciting, romantic romp through Len Deighton's *Funeral in Berlin* less. In fact, it takes an effort to recall that both stories have the same setting, that the two Berlins are not instead four. The only common element is the Wall, but even that is different: in *Funeral in Berlin* it must be crossed in a coffin; in *Two Views* a train will do. The difference is probably the difference between spies and ordinary people, and it is an important one to remember, because most of the people who come through the Wall belong to the latter category. And as *Two Views* shows with almost documentary clarity, their reasons for coming are neither glamorous nor political.

In January of 1961, Dietbert, a photographer in a small West German town, and Beate, a nurse in an East Berlin hospital, meet in West Berlin and begin what Beate calls "an affair, a flirtation, a week, a relationship, a beginning." In August of 1961, the Berlin Wall goes up. Dietbert and Beate exchange three short letters. In January of 1962, Dietbert successfully arranges Beate's escape from East Berlin. The act is extraordinary for one reason: it has no apparent motive.

It certainly has nothing to do with

politics. To Dietbert, the Berlin Wall is essentially a physical barrier. He photographs it daily for his provincial newspaper, but he is interested in its architecture—"the cement blocks, the layered concrete slabs, tracery of barbed wire"—not in the incidents it provokes. He hates to wait in line at its checkpoints, and he is irritated by futile hours spent in telephoning East Berlin; but these frustrations are merely extensions of the difficulties he encounters in West Berlin, where his red sportscar is stolen, and where he cannot get a hotel room. His enemy is the large city, not its dividing Wall. He is preoccupied by the shaming loss of his car, his dependent position at work, and his inability to save money. He does not think about politics. To Beate, the Wall is an inconvenience. It isolates her from things she feels entitled to—Western friends, movies, clothes, and medicines—but like Dietbert, she is more concerned with her personal life, with her nurse's training and a room of her own. She sometimes resents her confinement, but secretly believes the West will collapse.

Although they both know many people who have passed through the Wall, neither honestly believes escape is possible. Furthermore, neither of them really wants it. Dietbert spends weeks at a time in West Berlin without once trying to contact Beate, and he never realizes that the bar in which he spends most of his evenings is an informal headquarters for escape projects. When he is finally leaving the city for good, he stumbles—completely by accident—upon a group which arranges everything for Beate. He needn't lift a finger. Beate declines several opportunities to go because her "affairs are not in order," and she maintains almost constant contact with the Western escape network without making one request for help. She does not think of fleeing for Dietbert.

They do not care enough about one another for that. There is no emotional investment to protect, no stake to gamble for. Without the Wall, they would probably have quarreled and parted. But because the Wall denies them a natural meeting place, a place to finish their affair, it thrusts commitment upon them.

For Dietbert, in the end, the escape is an act of inertia, born of vague anxiety and vague guilt from neglect of his vague moral code. "His education, from his school friends and movies, had trained him to regard a promise of love as final until a couple parted in a quarrel. To be sure he had had a quarrel with her, but afterward he'd written her that foolish stuff about his love. . . . Confronted with the helpless position in which her government had placed her, he felt frightened by a vague obligation that he had entered into before its nature had been made clear to him." The Wall itself—not the politics of the Wall—governs his behavior. It provides him with an obligation to fulfill.

For Beate, the escape is an exercise of a kind of territorial imperative, a reclamation of what is hers by right. "The two cities of Berlin had always been her neighborhood, the adjacent area, property to be used. . . . Locked in one, she felt cheated, deceived, deluded." She comes not for Dietbert, whom she deserts upon arrival, not for a "better" life, but for the city itself: "She had no intention of giving up Berlin."

But even these motives are obscure. Dietbert and Beate do not know what they feel, they do not think clearly, and they are inarticulate or incompetent or both. The whole affair is accidental, coincidental, and muddled from beginning to end. And this very human obscurity of motive has a curious effect: it makes all of the other escapes in the book (indeed, all escapes) suspect. They too seem fake, trumped up, accidental. They lose meaning (most of all political meaning) for anyone but the participants. The word "defection" does not apply. For if the world can mistake Dietbert for an unhappy lover, its judgment of anyone else's motives is bound to be inaccurate.

The tone of *Two Views* is flat, as low-keyed and objective as a newspaper account, and it is appropriate to the story, whose tension never stretches beyond the limits of its prevalent emotion, vague anxiety. Johnson does not take sides, does not judge or label. His people live their lives regardless of politics, regardless of citizenship, and they use the material available to them in whatever way

they can. Neither Dietbert nor Beate has much to work with: West and East offer equally impoverished soil. It is not a meaningful choice.

Two Views is a beautifully written and controlled book. There is not an extraneous word or scene; everything is designed and laid out as if on a map, in two objective, concise dimensions. The only disturbing thing about it, in fact, is this beauty of design. Johnson has created two ordinary, rather unimaginative characters, whose thoughts and actions are rigorously limited by their intelligence. They become unusual because of their setting, but they are also unchanged by it. Their one supposedly decisive act has absolutely no effect on their lives. Johnson makes this point well, but it is a surprising departure from his first novel, *Speculations about Jakob*, where politics affects everything. Perhaps this is because the characters are more intelligent, more complex. They require many dimensions; they cannot be contained by a map; and they make a much more exciting book.

A Smuggler's Bible

JOSEPH McELROY

Harcourt, Brace, \$6.95

RUTH M. VANDE KIEFT

This novel, encased in a sober biblical black and gold-lettered binding and covered by an inflammatory red jacket, defies brief description almost as much as the original bible does. To attempt the impossible: it is a manuscript (hidden in a carved-out bible used to carry valuable contraband) written by a young man named David Brooke, and containing his "eight principal parts": the chapters, which are also "memoirs" or life studies, "stolen" (in one case literally) from a number of fascinating people David knows intimately or distantly.

From the interchapters we learn the origins and circumstances of David's project. A personal crisis leading him to a state of near breakdown is resolved into his following the imperative of an "intimate mechanical voice" which speaks to him out of "one of those experimental weighing machines" in an exhib-

it: the voice, after announcing David's weight, prescribes, in the manner of a horoscope, "Project yourself into the lives of others . . . analyze, synthesize, assimilate; project yourself." It appears to be David's diabolical wit, his coldly analytical mind and encyclopedically retentive memory that take over the project; for this is the tone of the voice, the alter-ego, which assumes control over him and speaks with shrewdness and cunning in the interchapters.

Does David "belong" to the alter ego? In a sense (or at first) he does, and this is one source of the book's wit and word-play, its ingenious and complex formal and symbolic structure, reminding one of Joyce's literary practices as well as his theory, outlined by Stephen, that "the artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence . . . paring his fingernails."

David is cold, prying, humanly uncommitted, the alien presence who systematically registers all; that is the common complaint of his intimates. His "projection" bears a frightening resemblance to the destructive leech-life of a Chillingworth. But as with Joyce (or Stephen), this ego which is the artist-creator is not McElroy's (or David's) total self, not even the self which is able to bring the people of fiction so abundantly to their own unique lives by granting them, through "indifference," their own autonomy. There is a power, a gift of the mind and spirit, which precedes the "projection" and follows, so clearly for the reader, in its wake: it is the old familiar one of love. It accounts for the tenderness with which we recall Molly, Leopold, Stephen and the others; and here Julia, Halsey, David and the others.

In relentless pursuit of smuggling in all its forms in himself and others, David finds it everywhere as fraudulence, pretense, insincerity; cheating in human relations; phoney scholarship, philosophy, religion; a fictional art so intricate and inclusive in its areas and patterns of exploration as to be itself suspect. But his projections disclose that every instance of fraud is mixed with a positive, innocent, or at least helpless motive; every smuggler pursues, steals, or captures some-

C. S. Lewis. Christian Reflections.


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192 pages, \$3.95.



**WM. B. EERDMANS
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14 April 1967: 131

thing priceless, some essential human value, which undercuts the deception all too benignly.

What qualities has this book to justify the theft of its title? The old book was surely a smuggled one: filled with the contraband of men who were too original to care about being credited as separate identities, pulling over their individual faces the esteemed mask of a Moses, David, Solomon, or St. John; and when the mask merged with the face of the scribe, he never knew the difference nor cared. This new bible is also full of precious smuggled objects, part history, part myth and legend, part vision and revelation. A "one-man book," being modern; its fictional form, modern; its scepticism, modern; but much of its value depends on the smuggling from other people's works and lives, living and dead, obscure and famous, modern and ancient. Being a collection of books, like the old one, it is constantly threatened by disunity; but like it also in some of its unifying themes and conclusions (you save yourself by losing yourself. Or "ambition—I mean, really, *action*, requires us to forget. . . ."; "forgetting those things which are behind, I press forward to the mark of the high calling . . .").

Like the old one too, it deserves more than a place on people's shelves: it deserves to be read.

College of One

SHEILAH GRAHAM

Viking, \$5.95

WARREN COFFEY

Sheilah Graham has come up a hard road—from London's East End, through an orphanage, and then a place in the chorus line at the Pavilion with a lot of pawing and varied ingenious propositions from stagedoor toffs. Through the early acts, it looked like *The Girl Who Took the Wrong Turning* for her. But Miss Graham, Lily Shiel that was, was having none of that. She trained herself to do newspaper writing and because she was smart and tough ended up rich in Hollywood writing a syndicated movie column.

There in 1937, she met and fell in love with F. Scott Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald was trying to write himself out from under \$40,000 in debts and not having much luck at it. He was in trouble with the studios and drinking a lot. But Sheilah Graham loved him enough to throw over the Marquess of Donegal, to whom she was engaged, and become his mistress, marriage being out of the question because of Zelda. If all of this is starting to sound like a costume picture you saw in 1958, it may be because that is what *Beloved Infidel*, Miss Graham's

account of her life with Fitzgerald, eventually became: Gregory Peck wore his saddle shoes and Deborah Kerr was thirty-five.

Miss Graham had the help of Gerald Frank on the book, which may account for some of the soap. But the fact is that she helped Fitzgerald to get himself in hand in the last years of his life and start at *The Last Tycoon*, in which the character Kathleen is based on her. Fitzgerald died of a heart attack in her Hollywood apartment on December 21, 1940.

Since telling this story in *Beloved Infidel*, Miss Graham has written one other book, *The Rest of the Story*, in which she brought her own history up to date. And now in *College of One* she has plucked out of forty boxes of Fitzgerald papers in the Princeton library the documents bearing on a most remarkable episode in her life with him, his campaign to give her in two years a liberal education in history, literature, music, art, and philosophy. Fitzgerald died before graduation time, but he made, the book reveals, a professor of great tact and wit and charm. *College of One* prints his outline and reading-lists for the course along with Miss Graham's memories of it. The book also includes an eleven-thousand-word lecture on Hollywood written by Fitzgerald for Miss Graham, this appearing for the first time in print, and a short story, "Beloved Infidel," that she wrote as an assignment and that he edited and revised for her. The story is an account, with an absolute minimum of fictional disguise, of her affair with Fitzgerald.

John Lardner I think it was who said of a certain lady journalist that "she didn't use her fingernails just to open letters." Sheilah Graham's writing has

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BERNARD MCCABE teaches English at Tufts University.

JUDITH SKLAR is on the staff of a New York publishing house.

RUTH M. VANDE KIEFT is a free-lance writer and critic.

WARREN COFFEY teaches English Literature at the University of San Francisco.

sometimes gone that way too. In *College of One* it shows up chiefly in an ungenerous treatment of Hemingway which recalls for us not only that Fitzgerald was not drinking at the end of his life and was not insane and didn't shoot himself but also intimates that Zelda had Hemingway pegged right all along as a homosexual. But Sheilah Graham's prejudices are at least plainly in view, and it is easy to make the necessary allowances for them. Once this is done, the reader can get along with what is, on the whole, a remarkably plain, unvarnished tale of her relationship with Fitzgerald.

College of One gets across very sharply the irony and the precariousness of Sheilah Graham's situation in the 1930's. Her education had ended when she left the orphanage as a girl, and she lived in constant dread of making the slip that would betray her ignorance and her slum origins. Though she wrote a widely read column, she had never even learned what a pronoun is. And she couldn't tell anybody about the agonies this caused her for fear of being taunted. But she did tell Fitzgerald, and when he realized how vulnerable she was in the matter, he undertook to educate her. Once in a drunken rage he taunted her about her ignorance, but starting in May, 1939, and interrupted only by a long binge later that year, he worked at a plan of education that was to take her in two years over most of the ground covered in a college.

H. G. Wells' *Outline of History* was the core book, supplemented chiefly by novels, plays, and stories, and, of course, lectures by the professor in charge. He sent her Matthew Arnold's *Essays* inscribed "For Sheilah, with love (and annotations.)" When they studied poetry he taught her to shuffle off to Buffalo to the rhythms of T. S. Eliot's "Boston

Evening Transcript." He took her through Keats and Shakespeare and Plutarch's *Treasury* and through novels by just about everybody.

He took her through Greece and Rome—"Scott and Sheilah thru the ages" he wrote under a picture in her Plutarch—and he took her through all the painters and composers, too. The course was a kind of Intelligent Lady's Guide to Western Civilization, and Fitzgerald ran a very stylish tour. Every day was ladies' day with F. Scott Fitzgerald. They always brought out the best in him, and in *College of One* the old dazzler is at his generous and witty best and clearly enjoying himself. But his appearance is a very short one, and the book, though of considerable interest and charm, is pretty slight, especially at \$5.95.

CORRESPONDENCE



(Continued from page 107)

painfully black-and-white?

Is the endless intellectualizing about The Pill as boring to Catholics as it is irrelevant to the overpopulated and underfed world, both in and out of the Church?

Does the ecclesiastical bureaucracy ever wonder how Catholics (other than those contractors and politicians who inevitably are part of the diocesan Establishment) really feel about Church lobbyists at the State Legislature? Or about multimillion-dollar campaigns to replace handsome, sound old buildings in the "ghetto" with shiny, factory-like new ones in the suburbs? Guess who advises that they are needed, and then builds them.

Why are Church real estate and stockholdings whispered about, not acknowledged openly? The Church is Big Business; but what is worse, it is hypocritical about it. Why is secrecy such a recurrent theme at the Vatican? (I am a Catholic, not a Paul Blanshard, and I suspect there are many, many Catholics who feel as I do.)

Presumably, the Archdiocese of Los

From the pen of
**PIERRE
LECOMTE
DU NOÛY**

author of *Human Destiny*

Between Knowing and Believing

Translated from the French by Mary Lecomte du Noüy. Introduction by George N. Shuster, Assistant to the President, University of Notre Dame. Foreword by Albert Delaunay of the Pasteur Institute, Paris.

Ever since *Human Destiny* burst upon the American literary scene in 1947, one of the most asked questions has been this: how did Lecomte du Noüy, a man of science, come to believe that Man is not on this earth by chance alone, but because of some purpose that transcends the laws of matter. This book answers that question by following the development of his thinking through his writings.

The essays, reproduced in chronological order from 1929 to 1945, offer a remarkable portrait of a pilgrimage from skepticism to the reconciliation of Science and Belief. Lecomte du Noüy's passionate love of science is coupled with a courageous analytical mind, a combination that later compelled him to question the adequacy of purely chemical or physical methods when applied to organized living matter.

Also included in this new volume are two letters, published in English for the first time, from Teilhard de Chardin to the Lecomte du Noüys. These letters show the degree to which these extraordinary Frenchmen influenced one another.

Illustrated by Bazaine

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Angeles would not put up with a Red Dean, so why must it and the rest of Christianity suffer a Cardinal McIntyre?

Suppose a Catholic—even a Catholic priest—were to write to the Pope, what are the chances that the letter eventually would be read by him, not to say answered by him? Was Pope Paul VI shielded from the correspondence of Father DuBay, even with all the publicity? If not, shouldn't we have expected comment from the Pope's own lips? Are all those things which would prevent a

Pope from reading such a letter really that important? One imagines an Anglican letter-writer would have far better luck at the hands of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Trivial? I think not.

Do our prelates feel as ridiculous with their "eminences" and other archaic, worldly titles, weighted down with their skirts and shawls of silk and lace, and bejewelled like the perfumed denizens of opening nights, as we who have to address them and look at them? If we must keep the opiates of the Renaissance in

the name of art and history, can't it at least be done in style? Would it be unthinkable to turn in one of those pectoral crosses for a decent organist and choir-master? Or are the tacky trappings of the Knights of Columbus—dinner jackets worn in the morning—more to the point? . . .

If my ill-tempered grievances are clichés to the *Commonweal* reader, he nevertheless can add copiously to what is only a partial list.

I submit that the complete list is what the renewal mess is all about. Whether the renewal has been "ineffectively publicized" or not, it certainly has been "ineptly handled." But I think the list is more fundamental than that. Given the "changes aplenty" claimed by Mr. Callahan, the Church reveals an alarming number of the unattractive traits of pre-Council days, traits that don't require much analysis. Is a Bishop riding in a limousine like a camel squeezing through the eye of a needle? Whether "methodological" or "substantive," there is still plenty of vulgarity, tawdriness, gracelessness. Good taste, if hard to define, is not Godless. So why at least shouldn't we raise our earthy standards and demand some leadership in Catholic communication, Catholic architecture and decoration, Catholic music and ceremony, even Catholic fund-raising? I guess that would rule out bingo.

FRANK P. L. SOMERVILLE

New York, N.Y.

To the Editors: With reference to Mr. Callahan's recent piece, "The Renewal Mess" (March 3), it would appear that he has thought himself into a distorted analysis of what is causing the current disenchantment and malaise among Catholics.

The analytical tool of manifest and latent effects is well established, but it might be applied in a different and broader way.

The problem we face is much more radical than analyzing new forms, new moral teachings, new dogmas to insure that their latent effects supply the same (or similar) needs as those they replace. The problem is that the *de facto* latent effects of many traditional Cath-

Coming Soon

In the weeks ahead *Commonweal* plans to discuss a variety of subjects typical of its range and scope. Here are a few of the subjects to be presented in feature articles:

Authority in the Church

U.S. Exploitation of Under-developed Countries

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The Relevance of Von Hügel

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olic teachings and practices add up to an insurance-like hedge against eschatological contingencies, at the smallest possible premium of commitments to the average Catholic.

New forms and reformed teachings have a unity of effect requiring personal involvement of the "insured" in the spirit of Christ's Way, Truth, and Life on the psychological level as well as on the formal level. This is true of the whole cloth of reform—from the participatory liturgy to the change-of-heart required of most Catholics on questions of justice for racial and economic minorities.

Mr. Callahan's implied apology for the depth and speed of reform is misplaced. The typical Catholic can no more move from formalism to true Christian commitment at deliberate speed, than the typical smoker can quit, one cigarette at a time.

The formal Catholic needs a dramatic confrontation with his own emptiness. This can only be accomplished by a stark presentation of difficult Christian principles made relevant to the unchristian atmosphere found abundantly

today in Church and World. This the Catholic Church has begun to do. It would be tragic if the process were halted in response to first confusions, thus putting off the crisis the Church needs to recover the vigor of its early mission.

ROBERT ALLEN

Milwaukee, Wisc.

To the Editors: Callahan's article "The Renewal Mess" (March 3) hit the nail on the head. I would like to continue the discussion where he seemed to leave it off: Callahan's use of Robert Merton's distinction between the *manifest* and the *latent* purposes in human social behavior was very helpful, but Callahan ended by suggesting that we must now discover a new range of *latent* meaning to our patterns of Catholic living. On the contrary, we may simply have to learn to *do without*. This indicates how profound the revolution in our consciousness is that we are not facing. In fact, I'm rather surprised that Callahan didn't draw the same conclusion—for the examples he offered between *manifest* and *latent* purposes in Catholic teaching reveal that whenever the *latent* purpose behind some activity (be it religious vows or frequenting confession) is actually at odds with the *manifest* reason then the individual or the whole society is involved in a schizoid pattern. If what we proclaim on the *manifest* level is real enough to proclaim it, then it ought to be enough for us, period.

Nor is this expecting the impossible. In other areas of our lives we achieve this degree of maturity. Consider one's consumption of something pleasant like beer. Granted that when I was sixteen or seventeen my *manifest* reason for drinking was that I liked the taste of beer while the *latent* reason moving me to have an occasional drink was the desire to prove "that I was grownup," "that I could make it in the grown-up world," etc. But as the years passed, my need for a separate *latent* purpose in drinking has simply bubbled away. I now drink beer because I enjoy drinking beer.

If we can achieve operational maturity in matters as simple as this, there's hope we can achieve it in something as important as our whole context of Christian living.

ROBERT E. LARKIN

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